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I. INTRODUCTION 
Oil and gas operations are the single most important activity car-
ried on by American multinational corporations. Five of the largest ten 
U.S. multinational corporations are international oil companies. The 
book value of U.S. investment abroad in petroleum approached $25 
billion in 1971 and represented almost 30 percent of total U.S. direct 
investments abroad. 
Despite its great importance, there is almost a complete dearth of 
information on the subject of U.S. and foreign taxation of these interna-
tional oil operations. There has never been a comprehensive study pub-
lished by either a government or private body. It is hard to find even 
partial data necessary to an analysis of the tax situation of the major 
companies. While there is a vast general literature on the tax laws 
applicable to foreign income, the particular application of this law to the 
oil industry is so sparse that one can count on the fingers of one hand 
the number of significant articles that have dealt specifically with this 
subject. 
What information there is indicates that U.S. oil corporations pay 
very low taxes to the United States. Thus, one estimate is that in 1972 
the 19 leading oil companies paid about $700 million in federal income 
taxes on a net income of about $11.5 billion or an overall effective U.S. 
rate of about 6 percent. In contrast, these companies paid about $5.1 
billion to foreign governments. If it is assumed that about one-half of 
the net income of these companies was domestic and about one-half was 
foreign, and that a sufficient part of the $5.1 billion of foreign taxes was 
used as credits to offset residual U.S. taxes on the foreign income, it 
would mean an effective U.S. tax rate on domestic income of between 
10 and 20 percent and an effective U.S. tax rate on foreign income of 
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close to zero. Of course, 1972 was a low income year for oil companies, 
particularly as compared to 1973, and the assumptions here are very 
rough. However, if not precisely accurate, these estimates are sufficient 
to suggest the problem. We are basically dealing with a major U.S. 
industry that operates without payment of significant U.S. taxes. This 
raises four basic questions: 
1. How do American international oil companies achieve this highly 
favorable U.S. tax treatment? What are the key tax provisions and how 
do they operate to produce this virtual exemption from U.S . tax on 
foreign income? 
2. What is the rationale for these key tax provisions? How did these 
key provisions of our tax laws develop historically? 
3. What proposals for reform of taxation in this area have been made? 
What changes would be needed to produce a more substantial tax 
contribution from international oil operations? 
4. What are the likely effects of proposed tax reforms as compared 
with the present system? What would be the ultimate consequences of 
tax changes affecting the oil and gas industry? 
Having raised these four questions, let me hasten to say that I 
cannot hope to set forth complete or definitive answers. The most that 
I can do is to provide such thoughts as I have that may be relevant to 
the answers. 
II. NATURE OF THE ACTIVITIES OF INTERNATIONAL OIL 
COMPANIES 
Two complex areas of the tax law are applicable to the activities of 
U.S. oil companies, namely, that dealing with natural resources and 
that dealing with foreign income. The interaction of the rules in these 
two areas raises a host of difficult issues at both the technical and policy 
levels. For example, the question of the U.S. credit given for the taxes 
imposed by Saudi Arabia raises the technical issue of whether they are 
"income taxes" and the policy issue of whether, however they are classi-
fied technically, they should be fully credited. Before dealing with the 
major technical provisions and the policy issues they raise, however, it 
is necessary to briefly classify the operations of international oil compa-
nies in a way that permits analysis for U.S. tax purposes. 
First, there are those activities which are the core activities of oil 
and gas companies. These involve, first, exploration for oil and gas; 
next, development of oil and gas properties once found to a point where 
they are ready to produce oil and gas; and, third, production of oil and 
gas, the actual lifting of oil and gas out of the developed wells. 
Second, there are those activities which are closely related to the 
core activities. These include storage of oil and gas once taken from the 
ground; transportation, usually by shipping in tankers or through pipe-
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lines; financing the basic and related operations; and ancillary service 
activities such as insurance and administration. Also in this category 
one might include marketing of the crude oil or refining, since most 
major oil companies are integrated operations which carry on these ac-
tivities as a normal matter. 
Finally, there are those activities which are essentially unrelated to 
the basic activities. These occur, for example, when an international oil 
company invests in a petrochemical complex to utilize certain of the 
products of its refinery or sets up its own controlled retail operations or 
invests its income in real estate. While many oil companies carry on 
these activities, they are not necessarily required by the core oil busi-
ness. 
With this categorization of activities as a framework, I turn to an 
analysis of the federal income tax treatment of these companies. 
III. KEY TAX PROVISIONS UTILIZED BY OIL COMPANIES 
There are at least eight key aspects of U.S. tax law which must be 
understood in order to have an appreciation of the tax treatment of 
international oil companies. 
A . ExpensinR Intan{.?ible DrillinR and Development Costs 
Expenses incurred during exploration and development may be 
written off immediately in full under the tax laws. This applies to ex-
penditures made both abroad and in the United States. Expenditures 
made abroad must be made through domestic subsidiary corporations, 
but this is a formal requirement that generally presents no practical 
problems. Even if a foreign country requires use of a local (foreign) 
corporation to explore and develop oil and gas properties, agreements 
between the required foreign corporation and a domestic subsidiary cor-
poration can make the domestic corporation the entity holding the eco-
nomic interest and entitled to receive the U.S. tax deductions. 
These deductions incurred in exploration, even those incurred 
abroad, can immediately offset U.S. income. This U.S. income can be 
from any source, such as domestic retail operations or even real estate 
ventures. Assuming the company has sufficient income to use the de-
ductions, the U.S. Government in effect is absorbing about 48 percent 
of the expenses incurred by oil companies in the exploration and devel-
opment of new oil and gas properties. 
The tax treatment here can be contrasted with that applicable to 
manufacturing industries generally. With respect to manufacturing in-
dustries, amounts spent to secure a new plant are allowed an investment 
tax credit and depreciation. The investment tax credit provides for an 
immediate write-off that is an extraordinary allowance. But while accel-
erated methods are available, depreciation basically must be taken over 
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the useful life of the property. Thus, the tax treatment of oil and gas is 
significantly more favorable than that of manufacturing generally in 
terms of the immediate deductibility of capital costs. 
B. Percentage Depletion Allowances 
The removal of a mineral from its natural reservoir during produc-
tion diminishes the quantity remaining until eventually the recoverable 
supply is exhausted. The exhaustion of a wasting asset is considered to 
be depletion for which the tax laws must take account. 
There are basically two types of depletion. Cost depletion repre-
sents a write-off during removal on some appropriate basis of the actual 
costs expended to acquire the resource. Percentage depletion is an artifi-
cial allowance based on an arbitrary amount of the income received from 
the removal of the oil and gas from the property. The current rate of 
depletion for oil and gas is 22 percent. Because it is an artificial allow-
ance, it is not limited to the costs incurred, which, as noted above, are 
generally already expensed as intangible drilling and development costs. 
Studies indicate that, generally, percentage depletion allowances may 
provide tax deductions which over the life of a productive property re-
cover 10 to 20 times its cost. The major limitation is that percentage 
depletion cannot exceed 50 percent of the income from the property in 
any one year. 
Again, percentage depletion is available with respect to production 
activities abroad as well as in the United States. As will be seen below, 
when taken on foreign income it has an important interrelationship with 
the foreign tax credit. 
Certain other mineral properties also receive depletion allowances, 
although generally at a lower rate. Oil and gas are not unique here, ex-
cept to the extent that the allowance is more generous and that one of 
the reasons other mineral properties receive this allowance is because of 
analogy to the oil and gas provisions. There is nothing comparable in 
the case of manufacturing industries. The investment tax credit is an 
extraordinary allowance, but it represents a one time incentive designed 
to induce the initial investment whereas percentage depletion is a con-
tinuous allowance as long as the taxpayer derives income from the prop-
erty. 
C. Foreign Tax Credits 
The United States generally allows a credit against U.S. tax for 
taxes paid to a foreign government on income earned abroad. There is 
a direct credit for income taxes imposed directly on a U.S. taxpayer and 
an indirect foreign tax credit for income taxes paid by foreign subsidiar-
ies of American companies. There are various qualifications and limita-
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tions on the foreign tax credit, the most important of which is that the 
taxpayer is required to elect between a per-country or overall limitation. 
The per-country limitation generally is more favorable from the 
standpoint of the taxpayer when losses are incurred in one foreign coun-
try and there is income and foreign tax credits in other foreign countries. 
In this case the losses will not operate to reduce the foreign tax credits 
available from the income-producing operations in foreign countries. 
The overall limitation generally is more favorable when there are 
significant variations in foreign effective rates, and maximum foreign 
tax credits can be achieved from an averaging of the various foreign 
effective rates. 
Most major oil companies apparently use the per-country limita-
tion, although at least some use the overall limitation. Regardless, since 
international oil companies pay high foreign taxes in countries where 
they own production facilities, the foreign tax credit permits the repatri-
ation of earnings with little or no residual U.S. taxes. Further, these 
foreign taxes in appropriate circumstances can shelter low tax foreign 
income derived from non-production activities. As discussed below, the 
issue raised by these high foreign taxes on production income is whether 
the foreign tax credit allowance is proper. 
D. Deferral of Tax on Foreign Income 
Foreign corporations owned and controlled by Americans generally 
are not subject to current U.S. income tax on their foreign income. All 
American taxpayers have this privilege of avoiding current taxation on 
foreign income by the simple act of directing it into foreign corporations, 
but few outside of the largest corporations make extensive use of the 
privilege. 
In the case of international oil activities, deferral has several as-
pects. With respect to some activities which are generally taxed at a low 
or zero rate abroad, like transportation (shipping) or finance, it effec-
tively avoids any U.S. tax at the time income is earned. With respect 
to activities abroad that generally produce high foreign taxes, such as 
the production of oil and gas, deferral itself does not reduce U.S. taxes 
since foreign tax credits generally would eliminate any residual U.S. tax 
anyway. Deferral does, however, allow the taxpayer to time the distribu-
tions from foreign corporations to U.S. corporations so as to achieve 
maximum foreign tax credits and, thereby, to reduce or eliminate resi-
dual U.S. taxes. 
E. Minimum Distributions Election 
In reforming taxation of foreign income, Congress has enacted pro-
visions intended to limit the deferral privilege. Thus, the Revenue Act 
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of 1962 enacted Subpart F and related provisions designed to curb "tax 
haven" activities. Subpart F would impose current taxation on such 
foreign-based activities of international oil companies as sales to related 
parties, services rendered for related parties, and finance that gives rise 
to passive income. However, a safety valve provision, the minimum 
distributions election, was inserted in the law. 
The basic concept of minimum distributions is that foreign taxes 
and U.S. taxes on distributions must produce an overall effective tax 
rate of 43 percent or more, roughly within 10 percent of the U.S. corpo-
rate tax rate. Where the foreign effective rate is itself 43 percent or more, 
no distribution is required, but complete relief from Subpart F is pro-
vided. 
The minimum distributions provision may be elected on a consoli-
dated basis in which a domestic parent and its domestic affiliates make 
the election with respect to all of their foreign subsidiaries. Moreover, 
branches of domestic corporations may be treated as foreign subsidiaries 
which have distributed all of their earnings. Thus, branches incurring 
intangible drilling and development cost deductions which are allowed 
to directly offset U.S. income are also taken account of in meeting 
minimum distributions requirements. This means that they reduce or 
eliminate any required distributions called for by this election. 
For those international oil companies incurring high rates of foreign 
tax on production income the minimum distributions requirement is 
met almost automatically. Thus, international oil companies may effec-
tively maintain tax haven activities and are indeed encouraged to find 
low tax activities to average out the high foreign taxes paid to producing 
countries. 
F. Western Hemisphere Trade Corporation Provisions 
Domestic corporations qualifying as Western Hemisphere Trade 
Corporations are permitted roughly a 14 percentage point reduction in 
tax. With respect to mineral activities conducted in Latin America, 
Venezuela, or in Canada, for example, the use of Western Hemisphere 
Trade Corporations can reduce the effective U.S. rate to 34 percent. 
Then foreign tax credit allowances can wipe out the residual U.S. tax 
computed at the reduced rate. Again, during exploration and develop-
ment, these domestic corporations can immediately write off all of their 
intangible drilling and development costs. 
G. Multiple Entities and Complexity 
Separate corporations, domestic and foreign, are generally used for 
various activities. This use of multiple corporations also provides flexi-
bility to achieve optimum tax rates in each foreign country of operation. 
Furthermore, the ability to file in the United States a consolidated 
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federal income tax return and to make a consolidated minimum distri-
butions election, allows international oil companies to achieve maxi-
mum results in the United States despite the use of separate corpora-
tions. 
Complex arrangements are often needed between the various enti-
ties in the corporate group. Intercompany financial and contractual 
arrangements are often required so as to maximize results. U.S. tax laws 
generally allow the taxpayer to structure his affairs in a way which 
permits this use of multiple entities and intercompany arrangements. 
The resulting complexity generally helps the companies since it is more 
difficult for the Internal Revenue Service to audit and verify compli-
ance . The Treasury Department's difficulty in accurately compiling to-
tals for the intangible deductions, percentage depletion allowances, and 
foreign tax credit benefits utilized by major oil companies further com-
plicates this situation. 
H. Revenue Safeguards 
The courts and the Internal Revenue Service have traditionally 
utilized various provisions to attempt to restrain tax avoidance and 
prevent tax evasion. Thus, there are section 482 provisions dealing with 
the allocation of income and deductions, including those dealing with 
pricing relations between related entities. There are also "substance 
over form," "business purpose," and "general tax avoidance" doctrines. 
These traditional governmental tools have been of limited assistance in 
policing the activities of international oil companies. While the Internal 
Revenue Service, during the 1960's, attempted to audit pricing arrange-
ments, the results were apparently mixed. One reason is that the com-
plexity and size of the taxpayers and the ornate and secret quality of 
many of the business arrangements made effective tax enforcement 
extremely difficult. 
IV. RATIONALE FOR KEY TAX PROVISIONS 
The next question to be dealt with is a brief summary of the ration-
ale for the key aspects of the tax laws described above. These will be 
taken up in the same order as the provisions themselves. 
A. Expensing of Intangible Drilling and Development Costs 
The basic rationale here is that the exploration for oil and gas is a 
high risk type of business. The thought is that unless there are adequate 
tax incentives this kind of high risk activity will not be undertaken. 
A question here is whether the same incentive should be provided 
for foreign exploration and development as is provided for domestic. 
Recent international events make this a doubtful matter. From the 
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standpoint of the national interest of the United States, properties dis-
covered abroad do not necessarily have the same benefits as those dis-
covered domestically. A question can be raised as to why any tax incen-
tives should be given to Americans to discover foreign oil and gas. 
B. Percentage Depletion Allowances 
Even most of its proponents readily admit that percentage deple-
tion is an artificial allowance. The rationale is that this allowance is 
justified by important public policy considerations, primarily national 
security. In the past, proponents have also maintained that the benefits 
of special tax allowances were largely passed along to consumers in the 
form of lower prices. 
We now seem to be in a new era where the price of energy is to rise, 
both to encourage conservation by consumers and to increase produc-
tion by suppliers. The question then becomes whether tax incentives 
that might artificially hold down prices are appropriate. Another essen-
tial question is whether the allowance does not result in an over-alloca-
tion of capital investment to discovery of this resource. It is no answer 
to say that we need all the energy resources discoverable, for there can 
be misallocation within the energy area. Percentage depletion, in effect, 
provides tax incentives for undertaking oil and gas activities as opposed 
to undertaking research and development to develop alternative energy 
sources and reduce consumption. 
There is also a question of how much incentive is needed. For years 
the rate was 27 .5 percent. It is currently 22 percent. In view of the prices 
oil and gas presently command, would oil and gas investment decrease 
at all if the allowance went down to 15 percent? How much less invest-
ment would be made in oil and gas if percentage depletion were re-
pealed? 
Regardless of its justification for domestic wells, percentage deple-
tion for foreign properties is questionable. As with the intangible drilling 
cost deduction, foreign properties are not the same as domestic ones 
from the standpoint of the national interest of the United States. 
Finally, I would point out that in the Estimates of Federal Tax 
Expenditures for 1972, prepared by the Staffs of the Treasury Depart-
ment and Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, the expen-
sing of exploration and development costs was estimated to be $650 
million and the excess of percentage over cost depletion was estimated 
at $1, 700 million, for a total tax subsidy of $2.35 billion. Undoubtedly 
the 1973 figures will be significantly higher. These amounts loom, I 
assume, very large compared to any amounts the Government might 
realistically provide for direct subsidies to develop or encourage addi-
tional energy supply. 
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C. Foreign Tax Credits 
While the rationale for the expensing of intangible drilling costs and 
percentage depletion is essentially · rooted in tax subsidy concepts, the 
allowance of the foreign tax credit is basically rooted in concepts of tax 
equity. The fundamental tax problem raised by international transac-
tions is that they generally involve the taxing jurisdictions of two or 
more independent countries. Foreign countries often impose tax burdens 
comparable to those that prevail in the United States. If both countries 
with a claim for taxing a particular international transaction were to 
impose their tax without regard to the other, the result would be double 
taxation with tax burdens that would deter or prevent international 
business. Indeed, it would be possible in the absence of accommodation 
mechanisms for tax burdens to exceed 100 percent of the income earned. 
The foreign tax credit is the basic mechanism by which the United 
States accommodates its tax system to that of foreign jurisdictions. It 
allows the source country to tax in the first instance, but the country of 
nationality then imposes its tax to the extent it exceeds that of the 
source country. 
The foreign tax credit is a particularly equitable method of accom-
modating conflicting jurisdictional claims. It is used by many countries. 
It .recognizes both the primary rights of the source country of income and 
the residual rights of the country of nationality. It provides an alterna-
tive to an exemption method, used by some countries, under which the 
country of nationality would never impose tax on foreign income, and a 
deduction method, which basically involves an under-allowance of the 
claims of the source country. 
If there were no foreign tax credit, American companies in many 
instances would have no practical alternative to divesting themselves of 
their foreign operations. Repeal of the foreign tax credit would be logical 
only if Congress decided to penalize foreign investment, just as adoption 
of an exemption method would be a decision to give a tax subsidy to 
foreign investment. 
On the other hand, there could be significant reforms of the foreign 
tax credit to make it operate more equitably. Thus, the present limita-
tions on its use are in need of review. There is little justification, for 
example, in allowing the taxpayer an election between the per-country 
and overall limitations. 
In the case of international oil, some unique questions are raised by 
the foreign tax credit mechanism. First is the question of whether the 
taxes imposed by producing countries are truly foreign income taxes. 
These countries have few activities to which their income taxes apply 
apart from oil production. The tax is imposed on an artificially created 
price and does not necessarily relate to the true income of the taxpayer. 
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Furthermore, the government is also the owner of the property and is 
presumably indifferent whether it receives royalties or taxes, as long as 
it is satisfied with the total amount of payments. Finally, the foreign tax 
credit applies to offset a U.S. tax liability on a net income already 
sharply reduced by intangible drilling deductions and percentage deple-
tion allowances, so it seems to be the final step towards tax avoidance. 
From a technical standpoint, it seems unclear to me that under 
current conditions the foreign taxes imposed on oil production are in-
come taxes of the kind that should be allowed as a credit against U.S. 
tax liability. Under current law it seems that these foreign taxes either 
are or are not creditable, and it would be difficult in principle to allow 
a credit for only a portion of them. Most importantly, even those who 
generally advocate the foreign tax credit mechanism must ask the ques-
tion whether these particular foreign taxes should, as a policy matter, 
be creditable. 
D. Deferral of Income for Foreign Corporations 
The basic notion here is that foreign corporations, even those owned 
by Americans, compete abroad with other foreign corporations and 
therefore should have to pay currently no more taxes than are paid 
abroad by their competitors. In the case of the American international 
oil companies, their principal competitors, such as those incorporated 
in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, France, Italy or Japan, gener-
ally are allowed deferral. All of these foreign oil companies probably 
achieve low effective tax rates. If deferral were eliminated by the United 
States, and the result were to impose substantial taxes, the argument 
would be that this would put the American companies at a competitive 
disadvantage. 
On the other hand, proponents of the elimination of deferral point 
out that U.S. taxpayers operating domestically have to pay substantial 
taxes and that American-owned corporations operating abroad should 
pay equal taxes. A difficulty with this argument in the case of interna-
tional oil companies is that their domestic tax rates are also very low, 
so that in applying a domestic standard it may be necessary to look to 
domestic taxpayers outside the oil and gas industry. This may suggest 
that reform in this area probably cannot, and should not, be focused 
solely, or even primarily, on the foreign activities of the oil companies, 
but should be focused on their overall activities, both domestic and 
foreign, so as to achieve an appropriate tax regime with respect to their 
worldwide income. 
E. Minimum Distributions 
The minimum distributions concept provides a comparison be-
tween the overall effective rate of consolidated overseas activities and 
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the U.S. tax rate. Based on this comparison, an abuse of the deferral 
privilege can be discovered. In contrast, it may be argued that income 
from particular tax haven transactions should be taxed by the United 
States regardless of the overall situation of the multinational company 
conducting the transactions. Those who favor the overall limitation on 
the foreign tax credit tend to favor the minimum distributions concept, 
while those who favor the per-country limitation are more likely to find 
fault with the concept. 
Even if the minimum distributions provision is sound, however, 
there could well be changes to make it work more equitably. Perhaps 
the overall effective rate should be equal to the U.S. rate, i.e., 48 per-
cent. Also, the ability to treat branches (where the deductions are 
taken currently as domestic deductions) the same as foreign corpora-
tions could be reconsidered. The approach taken would likely depend 
on whether deferral was being eliminated generally or whether an at-
tempt was being made to specifically deter only foreign tax haven 
activities. 
F. Western Hemisphere Trade Corporations 
The Western Hemisphere Trade Corporation provisions were en-
acted in 1942. Congress apparently was concerned about encouraging 
American multinational corporations to operate in Latin America and 
it desired to provide some tax incentive to this end. However, after some 
30 years in the Code, there has been no demonstration of the benefits 
or, indeed, who it is that is benefiting. Exporters have reaped benefits, 
as well as oil companies and others operating in Canada or Latin Amer-
ica. Justification for these provisions in terms of the national interest 
seems absent. 
G. Multiple Entities and Complexity 
The tax laws generally permit taxpayers to arrange their affairs so 
as to minimize income taxes. There is nothing peculiar or improper in 
the use of multiple corporations by U.S. oil companies, except that by 
virtue of the various other provisions discussed above and their sheer 
size and complexity, they are able to achieve an overall tax regime that 
provides virtual exemption from tax on foreign income and a particu-
larly low effective rate on domestic income. 
H. Revenue Safeguards 
Here again, there is nothing peculiar or improper about interna-
tional oil operations, except that because of their sheer size and com-
plexity and the interplay of so many favorable provisions, it is difficult 
for the traditional safeguards used by the Government to be effectively 
brought to bear. Further, the absence of public disclosure as to the 
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administrative application of the tax law to large oil companies makes 
it difficult for the American taxpayer to know whether the Internal 
Revenue Service is carrying out its responsibilities. 
V. INTERACTION OF KEY TAX PROVISIONS 
It should be pointed out that these key aspects of the U.S. tax law 
are inter-related. Any proposed changes in the law must take account 
of the complex and, sometimes, surprising interactions between provi-
sions. 
For example, the following illustration is an attempt to show in 
simplified fashion how the change from treating payments to a foreign 
government as a tax to a royalty would operate. The assumptions in the 
illustration are that a domestic company has gross receipts from the 
production of oil of $1,000; recoupable exploration and development 
expenditures of $250; operating expenses of $100; and other costs of $50. 
(1) (2) 
Gross Receipts 1000 1000 
Less: Royalty 
..122. _..:Q:_ 
Gross Income 700 1000 
Less : Percentage depletion (22%) 150* 220 187 
Intangible drilling costs 250 250 250 
Operating costs 100 100 100 
Other costs 50 50 2Q. 
550 . 620 
Taxable Income 150 380 
Tentative U.S. Income Tax (48%) 75 182 
Less: Foreign tax credit 0 300 
Net U.S. tax liability 75 -0-
Excess foreign tax credit (118) 
Net after tax return to company: 
Gross receipts 1000 1000 
Less: Costs other than percentage 
depletion 400 400 
Less: Payments to foreign country 300 300 
Less: Payments to U.S. 75 -0-
225 300 
* 50% limitation applicable. 
(1) Company pays 50% of net profits in form of royalty to lessor country. 
(2) Company pays no royalty, but 50% income tax to lessor country. 
(3) 
1000 
_J§Q 
850 
170 
250 
100 
...QQ. 
_Qfil 
263 
126 
150 
-0-
(24) 
1000 
400 
300 
-0-
300 
(3) Company pays 25% of net profit as a royalty and an income tax sufficient to bring 
to 50% the total payments to lessor country. 
(4) Half of tax in Column 3 treated as a royalty (i.e. , 12.5%) and a royalty sufficient 
to bring to 50% the total payments to lessor country. 
(4) 
1000 
225 
775 
570 
205 
98 
-12. 
23 
1000 
400 
300 
~ 
277 
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Column one shows the U.S. tax result if the company pays 50 percent 
of the net profits, i.e., $600 ($1,000 less $250, $100, and $50) to the lessor 
country in the form of a royalty. In this case, the U.S. tax is $75, and 
the company's net after tax return is $225. 
Column two shows the U.S. tax result if the company pays no 
royalty but a 50 percent income tax to the lessor country. In this case 
the U.S. tax is zero. In fact, there are $118 of excess foreign tax credits 
to be used; and the company's net after tax return rises to $300. 
Column three shows the U.S. tax result if the company pays 25 
percent of the net profits as a royalty and an income tax sufficient to 
bring to 50 percent the total payments to the lessor country. In this case, 
the U.S. tax is still zero. In fact, there are $24 of excess foreign tax 
credits to be used, and the company's net after tax return remains at 
$300. In all three cases, the lessor country has received $300. 
Further, the illustration shows that the amount of percentage de-
pletion allowed is affected by whether a royalty or tax is paid. Payment 
of a tax rather than a royalty increases the amount of the depletion 
allowance. 
It might also be noted that even if the percentage depletion allow-
ance were not available, there would still be no U.S. tax in the column 
two case (50 percent foreign tax) because the foreign tax credits would 
still be sufficient to offset the tentative U.S. tax. Further, if in the 
column two case, the United States were by law to treat half of the 
foreign tax as a royalty, the result would be that of the column three 
case, where the company still paid no U.S. tax. On the other hand, if 
half of the tax in the column three case were treated as a royalty, the 
result would be, as shown in column four, that the United States would 
collect a residual tax of $23 and the company's net after tax return 
would be decreased by that much. The foreign government would still 
receive $300. 
The illustration can also be used to show that at some point a 
proper mix of royalties (deductions) and taxes (credits) can achieve 
better results than just taxes (credits) and that converting part, or even 
all, of a foreign tax into a royalty can actually reduce U.S. taxes. Sup-
pose in the column two case the company incurred $380 of additional 
intangible drilling costs on another property in the lessor country and 
also realized $200 of U.S. source income. The additional $380 of deduc-
tions would wipe out the taxable income from the lessor country; the 
entire $300 of foreign tax credits would be an excess to be carried over; 
and the company would pay a U.S. tax of $96 (48%) on its $200 of 
domestic income. 
On the other hand, if the United States were by law to treat half of 
the foreign tax as a royalty, as shown in column three, the result would 
be that the company would have a net loss in the lessor country of $117, 
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which could offset domestic income; the $96 of potential U.S. tax on its 
$200 domestic income would be reduced to $40; and the remaining $150 
of foreign tax credits would be an excess to be carried over. The $150 of 
disallowed excess foreign tax credits would havei in effect, offset $117 
of domestic income. The change in U.S. law would have saved the 
company $56. 
Indeed, if three-quarters of the payments to the lessor country were 
treated as a royalty, as shown in column four, the $96 of potential U.S. 
tax on the $200 of domestic income would be reduced to $12, and the 
change in the U.S. law would have saved the company $84. Finally, I 
would note that if all of the foreign tax were treated as a royalty, as 
shown in column one, the $200 of domestic taxable income of the com-
pany would be entirely offset, and the company would pay no U.S. taxes 
at all; indeed, it would have a net operating loss carryover of $30 to use 
in later years. 
Additional and more complex examples would be necessary to even 
begin to do justice to the subtleties involved in the interaction of the key 
tax provisions described above. Major oil companies themselves, as I 
understand it, have large numbers of accountants and analysts 
equipped with computers and advanced methodology to do the various 
calculations necessary for tax planning. Suffice it to say that considera-
ble data relevant to tax analysis broken down by companies and careful 
study by experts are a prerequisite to any attempt to predict the actual 
results of changing one or more aspects of the tax law applicable to 
international oil operations. 
VI. HISTORY OF FOREIGN TAX RULES 
A look at the historical development of some of the principal foreign 
tax rules applicable to international oil activities is helpful to provide a 
perspective on current problems. Current deduction for intangible drill-
ing and development costs goes back to the very beginnings of the mod-
ern income tax in 1917. Percentage depletion was enacted in the Reve-
nue Act of 1926 effective retrospectively to 1925. Little consideration 
was given over the years to whether these special allowances should 
apply only to domestic as opposed to foreign activities. Foreign corpora-
tions owned and controlled by Americans have had deferral on foreign 
earnings going back to the beginning of the modern income tax in 1913. 
The foreign tax credit was also introduced at an early stage in 1918. 
The taxation of foreign income was reformed by the Revenue Act 
of 1962. While there had been piecemeal changes in the rules over the 
years, this was the first major reform of this area of the tax law. The 
debates during 1961and1962 covered a wide range of issues. Even then, 
however, little special attention was given to international oil compa-
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nies, which were largely treated the same as all other multinational 
companies. 
In 1963, President Kennedy recommended in his tax message that 
measures be adopted to prevent U.S. companies from using deductions 
for the development of mineral resources in foreign countries to reduce 
their U.S. tax on income earned in the United States. He also recom-
mended that consideration be given to preventing excess foreign tax 
credits on mineral income from offsetting U.S. taxes on other non-
mineral foreign income. These excess foreign credits arise from the al-
lowance of percentage depletion and the deduction of development costs 
on foreign mineral operations. The Treasury explanation of these recom-
mendations pointed out that the tax laws created a strong incentive to 
develop foreign natural resources since part of the cost of undertaking 
the development program is borne by taxes which would otherwise be 
paid on domestic income. This proposal did not meet with success, but 
it did, for the first time, raise publicly the issue of whether there were 
not special characteristics of international oil operations that required 
rules different from those generally governing foreign operations of 
American multinational companies. 
In 1969 the House Ways and Means Committee again directed at-
tention to some of the international tax aspects of foreign oil operations, 
and the House version of the Revenue Act of 1969 contained several 
provisions designed to deal with this subject. First, it was provided that 
a taxpayer who reduces his U.S. tax on domestic income by means of a 
loss from a foreign country would have this tax benefit recaptured by 
the United States when income subsequently is derived from the coun-
try. The mechanism for recapture would be a disallowance of the foreign 
tax credit in an amount sufficient to prevent a double tax benefit. 
A second provision provided for a separate foreign tax credit limita-
tion on foreign taxes paid with respect to income derived from foreign 
mineral production. Such a foreign tax credit limitation would preclude 
excess foreign tax credits, which arise from foreign mineral production, 
from being used to offset what would be the U.S. tax on other foreign 
income in the same or other countries. The House Ways and Means 
Committee report justified this separate treatment of income taxes on 
production income on the grounds of the difficulty of distinguishing a 
royalty payment from a tax payment where the foreign tax authority is 
also the owner of the mineral rights. 
Finally, the House bill eliminated percentage depletion with re-
spect to foreign source income, largely on the ground that it was not a 
necessary or appropriate incentive. 
Strong objections were made to these House provisions and ulti-
mately the Revenue Act of 1969 contained only a provision that excess 
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foreign tax credits attributable to percentage depletion could not offset 
tax on non-mineral income. However, the definition of "mineral in-
come" was sufficiently broad so as to include substantial low-tax foreign 
income, such as that from shipping, thereby enabling the oil companies 
to use much of the credits from production income against other types 
of foreign income. In short, the action that was taken did not signifi-
cantly affect the highly favorable tax treatment accorded the oil compa-
nies. 
In 1973 the Burke-Hartke bill was introduced. Persistent and active 
support of this legislation by organized labor concerned with the effect 
of American multinational corporations on domestic employment had 
generated considerable support in the Congress for reform of the taxa-
tion of foreign income. The tax provisions of Burke-Hartke itself would 
have eliminated deferral for all foreign subsidiaries, converted the for-
eign tax credit into a deduction, and made other extensive changes . 
While relatively few Congressmen were prepared to support Burke-
Hartke in all respects, there seemed to be substantial support for some 
sort of tax reform which would move in the direction outlined in the bill. 
In holding hearings on general tax reform in early 1973, the Ways 
and Means Committee put on its agenda various items under taxation 
of foreign income. The record developed was by far the most extensive 
since the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1962. The Treasury Depart-
ment, however, took no position until the public hearings were over. 
Then, on April 30, 1973, the Treasury Department made important 
legislative proposals affecting the foreign area as part of its proposed tax 
reform package. 
The Treasury proposed that certain losses incurred in foreign opera-
tions and deducted against domestic income would reduce foreign tax 
credits when the taxpayer earned profits from those operations. A sec-
ond reform proposed by the Treasury was to eliminate deferral for con-
trolled foreign manufacturing corporations which either benefit from a 
tax holiday or similar tax incentive or which manufacture abroad for 
sale to the United States and benefit from significantly lower foreign 
income taxes. Tax holidays were defined to include not only partial or 
complete exemptions from taxes, but such items as accelerated depre-
ciation or reinvestment reserves. 
The President also announced that he had instructed the Depart-
ment of the Treasury, in conjunction with the Department of Justice, 
to institute procedures involving mineral importing companies, which 
import from their foreign affiliates, to determine intercompany selling 
price and tax payments in advance. The purpose of this reform was to 
expedite the determination and payment of their taxes. This announce-
ment apparently was made to indicate the Government's frustration 
with certain mineral pricing practices and the delay in securing reve-
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nues in subsequent years from section 482 allocations of previous years. 
Dispute over what constituted appropriate foreign income reform 
prevented the inclusion of tax provisions in the Foreign Trade Bill pre-
pared by the House Ways and Means Committee and ultimately en-
acted by the House in December 1973. Instead, it was announced that 
the House Ways and Means Committee would undertake general tax 
reform in 1974 and that reform of the taxation of foreign income would 
be one of the items dealt with at that time. 
More recently, in February 1974, the Treasury made two new pro-
posals and reemphasized one old proposal (from April 30, 1973) with 
respect to foreign oil operations. The first new proposal is for the elimi-
nation of percentage depletion for foreign oil production. This is a pro-
posal which was incorporated in the House Bill version of the 1969 Tax 
Reform Act but which was deleted in conference after the Senate did 
not pass a comparable provision. The second new Treasury proposal 
relates to the foreign tax credit on production income. The proposal 
would limit the amount of foreign tax treated as a creditable tax to 48 
percent of taxable income from the foreign oil and gas property. The 
non-credited amount of foreign tax would be treated as o royalty deduc-
tion, which means that a complicated mathematical formula is neces-
sary in order to determine the breaking point for the amount of foreign 
tax which is treated as a deduction and the amount which is allowed as 
a creditable tax. This new limitation appears to be a per-item type of 
limitation which is applicable whether the taxpayer is on the per-
country or overall limitation. The Treasury also reemphasized its April 
30, 1973 proposal to recover losses previously allowed in the United 
States by disallowance of foreign tax credits. This proposal may have 
been inserted out of necessity. Otherwise the conversion of foreign tax 
credits, which are largely excess in many cases, to deductions could well 
have improved the tax position of some taxpayers by throwing them into 
an overall or per-country loss position, which loss could then have offset 
domestic income. 
The history of the foreign tax credit available to oil companies is 
largely an administrative rather than a legislative history. Following 
World War II, U.S. oil companies began to conduct extensive explora-
tion and development ventures in the Middle East. In late 1950, appar-
ently by arrangement with the companies and with the participation of 
the State Department, Saudi Arabia adopted income tax provisions 
which required the companies to pay a 50 percent tax based on trading 
companies taking oil from production companies at a posted price. Prior 
to 1950, the companies paid royalties, but no substantial income taxes, 
to Saudi Arabia. While some may say that the United States Govern-
ment suggested this new arrangement, I know of nothing published that 
clarifies what the exact roles of the particular parties were. The Ameri-
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can companies that were part of the Arabian American Oil Company 
began to claim substantial foreign tax credits beginning around 1951. It 
is not clear that there was any challenge by the Treasury Department 
to this claim that the Saudi Arabian tax was an income tax. However, 
given the magnitudes of money involved and the obvious sensitivity of 
the problem, it seems clear that beginning in the latter part of the 
Truman Administration and continuing on through the Eisenhower 
Administration an important pending issue was whether the Saudi Ara-
bian tax was an income tax for foreign tax credit purposes. Eventually, 
probably around 1953 or 1954, the Treasury Department decided that 
it was an income tax and issued private rulings to this effect. Subse-
quently, in 1955 this ruling was published as Rev. Rul. 296, 1955-1 
Cum. Bull. 386. 
While the status of the Saudi Arabian tax was under consideration 
in the early 1950's, the problem of Iran erupted. When a consortium 
including American companies was worked out to gain Iranian conces-
sions, it was part of the arrangement that Iran would adopt provisions 
to secure a 50 percent tax based on the posted price. Since there was no 
prior history of royalties in this case, the issue here was somewhat differ-
ent than with Saudi Arabia. Thus, it may actually have happened that 
the Iranian tax, rather than the Saudi Arabian tax, was the first Middle 
Eastern tax to be ruled an income tax. 
The extent of Congressional involvement in the decisions with re-
spect to the foreign tax credit is not clear. It would seem likely that 
leading members of the House Ways and Means Committee and Senate 
Finance Committee had some knowledge of what was taking place ad-
ministratively. Further, my understanding is that in 1958, the Senate 
Finance Committee requested that the Staff of the Joint Committee on 
Internal Revenue Taxation undertake to determine the background and 
reasons that the Arabian American Oil Company, a U.S. corporation, 
had been given a tax credit which essentially moved it from a taxpaying 
to a non-taxpaying status with respect to the United States. I under-
stand that a thorough study was done and printed by the Government 
Printing Office but ultimately was not made public by instruction of the 
Committee. This study did, however, undoubtedly make at least one of 
the two chief tax-writing committees of Congress formally and fully 
aware of the situation. 
During the 1960's there were administrative challenges by the Inter-
nal Revenue Service to the tax return positions being taken by U.S. oil 
companies. There were audits, as I understand it, several times during 
the 1960's which focused primarily on questions of intercompany prices, 
i.e., whether the posted price at which production companies sold to 
trading companies were arms-length prices. Apparently there were sub-
stantial arguments during the early 1950's, at the time the foreign tax 
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credit issue first arose, that the posted price was an arms-length price. 
However, by the late 1950's, after the advent of the U.S. oil import 
.program and other events, the posted price was less likely to be a true 
market price. Public information on these audits is not available, but 
it is my understanding that compromises were reached with the oil 
companies and substantial payments were made to the Treasury. As far 
as I know, the issue of whether the taxes were income taxes was not 
reopened during the 1960's. 
VII. CURRENT REFORM PROPOSALS 
There are several varieties of reform proposals currently being 
broached before Congress. First, there are what can be called 
emergency-type proposals. Thus, the proposal for a windfall profits tax 
as a temporary measure to take away much of the profits attributable 
to recent price rises is intended as a temporary measure. It would hope-
fully only be imposed for a short period and would be used as a kind of 
regulatory tool, perhaps with a trust fund and a plow back feature to 
turn earnings of oil companies into developing additional domestic re-
serves or other sources of domestic energy supply. Several versions of 
this tax have been suggested by the Administration and others. 
Closely related to the windfall profits tax proposal are excess profits 
tax proposals. As experience with excess profits taxes during World War 
I, World War II, and the Korean War has shown, such taxes are inher-
ently inequitable and unadministrable. They are repealed within a rela-
tively short time of the end of emergency conditions. Whether they are 
an appropriate response to current conditions is not clear either from the 
standpoint of the emergency at hand or the goals sought to be accom-
plished. 
Emergency-type measures involve a layering of the tax system. 
They build on existing tax rules without determining whether that foun-
dation is strong or weak. Perhaps this is necessary, but to professional 
tax experts it generally seems undesirable. Generally speaking, tax ex-
perts would favor the use of direct controls or other kinds of regulation 
to accomplish goals that largely do not relate to tax or fiscal policy. The 
tax laws often are not an adequate regulatory tool, and in making tax 
changes it is often better to accomplish those goals which are more 
specifically part of the tax system. 
A second kind of response is offered by spokesmen for energy com-
panies who want to keep all existing tax provisions as they are. More-
over, some believe the energy crisis would justify additional tax incen-
tives, such as a return of percentage depletion to 27 .5 percent or invest-
ment credits for new drilling. At the other extreme are those who would 
use the energy crisis to call for an immediate repeal of percentage de-
pletion, a capitalization of intangible drilling costs, and a conversion of 
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all foreign tax credits into royalties. There are also all shades of opinion 
in between. 
What I believe is needed is a thorough review and study of how the 
present law is operating and what impact there would be, in the light 
of recent price rises and prospective energy conditions, of various modi-
fications of the existing tax regime. Whatever changes are made, they 
should be well thought out and the consequences calculated. Hopefully, 
a long range program could be developed that is both fair to oil com-
panies and in the best interests of the country. 
The tax-writing committees of Congress, with the assistance of the 
Staff of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, are now 
undertaking a thorough examination of the present provisions and possi-
ble changes in such provisions as well as the adoption of emergency 
measures. The House Ways and Means Committee is at this time in the 
process of making initial decisions. Thus, it has tentatively indicated 
that it favors a phase-out of the percentage depletion allowance for 
domestic operations. It also seems to favor some form of windfall profits 
or excess profits tax with a plowback feature. With respect to foreign 
operations, it favors an elimination of percentage depletion, a repeal of 
the per-country limitation, and an additional limitation on the foreign 
tax credit which would restrict the extent to which foreign taxes paid 
on crude oil production could offset tax on income from other foreign 
activities. 
The House Ways and Means Committee can be expected to make 
final decisions and report a Bill within the next few weeks. Next, the 
House itself will take action, and depending upon what the Ways and 
Means Committee has decided, the full House may or may not require 
changes. After the House completes its action, the Bill will go to the 
Senate Finance Committee for hearings and action and finally the full 
Senate will take up the subject. If the House and Senate versions differ, 
a conference will be required. Given the highly controversial nature of 
the subject matter, it seems likely that there will be large areas of 
dispute and the whole process could well be time-consuming. It could 
be that any legislation will not be enacted until near the end of the 
present session of Congress. 
VIII. OBSERVATIONS 
Without attempting to prejudge the results of careful study and 
considered action, there are two concluding observations I would make. 
First, there are no simple and correct answers to what constitutes appro-
priate tax treatment for international oil companies. A balancing of 
interests and considered judgments on difficult issues is inevitably re-
quired. For example, in evaluating the present rules governing foreign 
oil activities, it is clear that in terms of equitable tax principles, the 
strongest case can be made for the allowance of foreign tax credits to 
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the extent that the payments are truly income taxes and not royalties. 
At the other extreme, the percentage depletion allowance is unquestion-
ably an artificial tax incentive device which can only be justified on 
strong policy grounds that do not appear present with foreign oil. The 
current deduction for intangible drilling and development losses is 
somewhere in between. As an incentive device, it is less objectionable 
than percentage depletion because it affects the timing of deductions 
but does not provide additional artificial allowances unrelated to actual 
capital costs. Even here, however, justification on policy grounds must 
be shown, or else normal tax principles would call for capitalization of 
these costs and a write-off over the period of production. 
Further, it is important to understand that a mere tinkering with 
one aspect of the overall regime of tax rules is not likely to be construc-
tive from anyone's standpoint. For example, turning part of the foreign 
tax credit into a royalty deduction would probably not change much 
from the standpoint of the major companies. In fact, splitting the for-
eign tax into income tax and royalty without more could even be helpful 
to some oil companies; most have excess credits in abundance and could 
in some circumstances derive U.S. tax benefits from additional deduc-
tions. Alternatively, repealing percentage depletion for foreign opera-
tions in combination with converting all of the foreign tax into a royalty 
might produce U.S. tax, and doing both of these things and requiring a 
capitalization of intangible drilling costs would be likely to result in 
residual U.S. taxes. 
On the other hand, it is not clear that such a tax regime would be 
equitable. Oil companies as well as manufacturing and other multina-
tional companies should expect to pay some reasonable amount of in-
come taxes to host or source countries, and, in fairness, only a part of 
what is paid to the Middle Eastern countries could equitably be treated 
as a royalty. 
Whether repealing of percentage depletion and converting part of 
the foreign tax into a royalty, as recently proposed by the Nixon 
Administration, would significantly change things is doubtful. Residual 
U.S. taxes would probably continue to be wiped out by the remaining 
foreign tax credits. 
It is difficult to evaluate most of the specific proposals made to 
date. Instead of focusing so heavily on the particular tax provisions, 
which are highly complex, it would be helpful to focus more heavily on 
the specific goals to be accomplished. The ultimate question is really 
what is the proper level of U.S. taxes that should be paid by U.S. oil 
companies? What will the economic and political consequences of such 
taxes likely be? 
I venture to say that if the Congress could reach agreement on goals, 
the tax experts on the Staff of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue 
22
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 2, No. 2 [1974], Art. 6
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol2/iss2/6
246 Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 2:225 
Taxation could readily produce the technical provisions required to 
implement the decision. If a proper assortment of amendments to the 
foreign tax credit, percentage depletion, intangible drilling costs and 
other existing provisions could not be found, it would be possible to 
construct a minimum tax mechanism that simply required a payment 
to the United States of, say, 10 percent, on some appropriate economic 
net income concept. 
As prior discussion has shown, many of the key questions are essen-
tially political questions disguised as technical tax questions. For exam-
ple, does it make a difference in our foreign relationships that American 
multinationals are deeply involved in international oil? Are these differ-
ences helpful or harmful to our national interests? Would the United 
States be better or worse off if the American oil companies were not 
deeply engaged in the Middle East? 
Foreign governments often own part of, or are closely tied to, their 
oil companies. Most countries do not tax their international oil compa-
nies on foreign operations whether through the vehicle of simple exemp-
tion or allowing foreign tax credits or granting reduced rates of tax or 
otherwise. Is it important for the United States to provide a comparable 
low tax regime for its companies? If so, should the United States simply 
begin to regulate and direct its oil companies more specifically? What 
level of U.S. taxes would be possible before American companies be-
came burdened with a competitive disadvantage? If this level is 
exceeded, what difference would it make if American companies could 
not be competitive with foreign companies in terms of conducting for-
eign oil operations? Is this resource so special that at an international 
level it should largely be a tax exempt industry? Might other govern-
ments, if the United States took the lead, also impose tax burdens on 
their companies? 
I point out these considerations because tax reform ultimately de-
pends on political judgments. International political considerations are 
vital to correct determinations of what the federal income tax treatment 
of the foreign earnings of oil companies should be. 
My second observation relates to procedural issues. In view of re-
cent events, it seems clear that a reopening of the foreign tax credit issue 
is justified. The Middle Eastern countries, indeed all oil exporting coun-
tries, no longer even try to maintain a facade that a so-called posted or 
tax reference price is a market price. Prices used for tax purposes are 
obviously no more than a price set in order to produce the so-called tax 
that the traffic will bear. Since the 1950's when the Internal Revenue 
Service rulings were first issued treating Middle Eastern taxes as income 
taxes, there have been many other changes in facts, additional cases as 
to what constitutes an income tax, and generally greater sophistication 
in the tax laws as to foreign tax matters. In short, the context and 
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jurisprudence relevant to this issue have dramatically changed. 
It does not seem to me to be worthwhile to debate whether the 
-decision in the 1950's to treat the Saudi Arabian and Iranian taxes as 
income taxes was correct. Substantial arguments could undoubtedly be 
made that they were true income taxes or that at least in substantial 
part they were true income taxes. However, the procedure by which this 
decision was made by our Government can be questioned. Rulings are 
often issued on the creditability of foreign taxes when the issues are 
technical. However, it is highly doubtful that the ruling process was a 
correct procedure for dealing with such a large and politically sensitive 
issue of tax policy as was involved in the Middle Eastern situation of 
the early 1950's. 
An obvious course would have been for the Executive Branch to 
request the Congress to pass legislation on the subject. Both tax-writing 
committees could then have considered the issue in depth; the public 
could have been heard; and both the House and Senate would have 
acted in open fashion. This, to me, would have been the best way to 
make such a momentous decision, one whose effects are still with us 20 
years later. 
Alternatively, the mechanism of international tax treaties could 
have been used. The United States now has some 30 international tax 
agreements, most of which were negotiated after World War II. In var-
ious circumstances, international tax agreements have dealt with im-
portant issues such as whether certain taxes qualify as income taxes. 
Our Government has attempted to use these treaties in order to provide 
tax incentives to investment in less developed countries. Thus, during 
the 1950's, when the Eisenhower Administration sought to encourage 
investment by granting credits for taxes foregone by foreign countries, 
they negotiated several so-called tax-sparing treaties. In the 1960's, 
when investment tax credits were to be given for designated new invest-
ments in underdeveloped countries, several tax treaties were also negoti-
ated. While none of these treaties was ever effectuated, it was because 
after full public disclosure and debate in open hearings, the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee did not act affirmatively. No one would 
claim, I trust, that the United States would have been better off if the 
Treasury had simply acted by administrative ruling to grant such tax 
incentives. 
Recently, when the Nixon Administration has sought to expand 
economic relationships with the Soviet Union and Eastern European 
countries, international tax agreements have been negotiated with these 
countries. These agreements are pending before the Senate Foreign Re-
lations Committee. If the committee disagrees with the concepts, this 
will be known. If it agrees, proper constitutional procedures will have 
been adhered to. How different is the decision in this situation from that 
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which was made in the Executive Branch alone in the 1950's? 
A principal advantage of the international tax agreement approach 
is that tax relationships as an important international economic rela-
tionship are negotiated between governments. If the United States is 
making concessions, it does so with the other government directly and 
in a conspicuous public format. Further, the treaty then goes before the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee and ultimately the Senate for 
approval. Thus, the political wisdom of a coordinant branch is brought 
to bear. The obligations being undertaken reflect, hopefully, a broad, 
national political consensus. 
Moreover, employing appropriate constitutional procedure is in the 
best interests of the other government. Saudi Arabia, Iran, and other 
OPEC countries would have been, and presently would be, far better off 
if international tax treaties had been entered into in the 1950's. 
Such treaties would have provided for many other advantageous tax 
relationships. For example, students and professors might have entered 
the United States in a preferred tax status. Dividends and interest 
remittances from U.S. investments could have passed preferentially 
without the need to incur the expense and b
0
urden of intermediaries in 
Switzerland and elsewhere. Perhaps, most importantly, tax agreements 
generally provide for administrative assistance, exchange of informa-
tion, and mutual cooperation. Would it not have been over the past 20 
years, and is it not now, in the best interests of the Middle Eastern 
countries, as well as the United States, to have a full exchange of data 
on the income, deductions, and other economic relationships relevant to 
taxes of the international oil companies? Who has benefited, or is bene-
fiting, from the affected and interested governments being without offi-
cial and regularized channels of communication on tax matters? 
It would be entirely permissible at this point in time for the Treas-
ury to announce that it was withdrawing prospectively the rulings that 
treat the taxes of Saudi Arabia, Iran, and other OPEC countries as 
income taxes, and that it would proceed to negotiate international tax 
agreements with these countries. If these countries still desire American 
oil companies to engage in business in their countries, they will un-
doubtedly negotiate tax agreements with the United States. If American 
oil companies are no longer welcome in these countries, then no tax 
agreements will be negotiated and companies of other countries will 
enter instead. I am assuming here, as seems likely, that it would not be 
economically feasible for American companies to engage in the oil busi-
ness in these countries without treating some substantial part of their 
taxes as income taxes for U.S. foreign tax credit purposes. I am also 
assuming that the Middle Eastern countries will continue to be willing 
to deal with American companies who are willing to pay current, and 
higher prices for oil. Somehow the relationships of the governments and 
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the taxpayers involved in international oil transactions should be 
brought into proper legal perspective, and international tax agreements 
would be one way to accomplish this. 
Finally, it may well be that under current circumstances interna-
tional oil companies are so large and so complex that they are beyond 
the powers of any single government or even pairs of governments to 
effectively deal with them for tax purposes. For example, the oil compa-
nies' pricing decisions affect the taxes of not only one or two countries, 
but many countries. It could well be that rapid, unilateral action by the 
United States on oil company tax matters is not in our own best inter-
ests and that the interests of other countries, if properly assessed, would 
lead the United States to a different position than if it were acting 
entirely on its own. In short, we are not dealing with just a U.S. tax 
problem of American companies, although that is a major aspect-we 
are also dealing with international tax problems of multinational com-
panies that affect many countries. 
It may well be that some sort of multinational tax agreement be-
tween leading industrial countries such as the United States, the United 
Kingdom, France, Germany, the other Common Market countries, and 
Japan, as well as the leading oil exporting countries such as those in-
volved in OPEC, is necessary to establish an equitable international tax 
regime. 
Regardless of whether unilateral, bilateral, or multinational solu-
tions are sought, two things seem clear: 
1. Far more specific data relative to tax issues must be developed 
in the best interests of all countries, oil importing and oil exporting; and 
2. An overall and deep view taking account of long term factors 
must be done. Overreaction to immediate circumstances and hasty solu-
tions to complex international tax problems would be a great mistake. 
Just as the energy crisis is a long term problem, current interna-
tional tax rules should be set, if possible, for the longer term. Hard work, 
careful consideration and cooperation by all affected parties are ulti-
mately necessary. 
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